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Abstract 
Energy security is a topic that is of increasing 
importance to policy-makers and yet is a relatively 
under-researched area. Although macroeconomists 
have noted that there may be external costs 
associated with energy security measures, there is 
no definitive methodology for calculating or 
assessing these externalities. This paper presents an 
overview of the theoretical externalities and 
develops estimates for the size of the external costs 
of energy arising from energy insecurity. In 
particular, the research centres on costs of 
electricity production and oil. 
 
his paper presents an overview of how 
energy security is related to the external costs 
of electricity production. For European 
policy-makers, energy security is an important issue 
because private decisions about energy use may not 
fully take into account the costs of energy 
insecurity. Disruptions in supply and dramatic price 
increases have macroeconomic impacts that 
individual consumers and firms do not take into 
account. Furthermore, agents tend to underestimate 
the risks of disruption and subsequent price 
adjustments, and there are other less tangible effects, 
such as the psychological costs of people feeling 
insecure about their energy supplies. Therefore, it is 
important from a policy perspective to estimate the 
size of the external costs of energy arising from 
energy insecurity.  
1.  Macroeconomic External Costs 
As noted in Hunt & Markandya (2004), there are 
three potential kinds of externality associated with 
energy security: 
-  Monopsony wedge externality. This occurs 
when the additional demand for imported oil 
from a country results in an increase in the 
world price of oil, thereby exerting an additional 
cost on other oil-importing countries. The 
importing country will – from an economically 
rational standpoint – ignore the additional cost 
to other countries and that constitutes an 
external cost. Note that there is no market 
failure in terms of global inefficiency, but the 
resulting financial transfers out of a 
country/region may be of concern.  
-  Incomplete rent capture. The consumer surplus 
– here understood as economic rent – is the 
difference between the market price and the 
price the consumer would be willing to pay for a 
given fuel mix quantity. It exists because of the 
inability of the supplier to capture the full rent 
from consumers using differentiated pricing 
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strategies. Thus, an energy mix change within a 
country, e.g. as a consequence of a greater 
proportion of imported gas, will lead to a 
change in the level of this rent and so result in 
an externality.  
-  Macroeconomic externalities. These result from 
changes in the international energy markets, e.g. 
increases in the price of oil, that impact on an 
importing or exporting country differentially, 
and in markets other than the energy market. 
Such changes generate externalities only to the 
extent that they constitute impacts not accounted 
for in individual decisions.  
There are major limitations in the techniques 
available for measuring in quantitative terms the 
first two types of externalities described above. 
Consequently, we focus our efforts on exploring the 
third type – the macroeconomic externalities.  
Macroeconomic externalities are examples of 
pecuniary externalities where the action of one 
economic agent affects another through changes in 
price(s). This means the measurement of any 
externalities has to be done through economic 
means, either modelling the economy or through 
empirical estimation. Modelling allows specific 
changes to be assessed, but requires an accurately 
developed and calibrated model – this can be 
expensive and the information required can be hard 
to obtain. Empirical estimation, by contrast, benefits 
from being derived directly from real-world data but 
suffers from having to find a specific outcome (i.e. 
size of the externalities) from a general dataset (i.e. 
the economic data). In the subsequent analysis, we 
use evidence from both methods – modelled and 
empirical – and estimate the gross cost of fuel price 
uncertainty to find the upper bound of the energy 
security externalities. 
Below, we report on a literature review of the 
impacts of energy insecurity relating to oil, gas and 
coal as it relates to electricity supply, with the focus 
on the EU region. On the basis of the findings of 
this review we make first estimates of the 
‘externality unit values’ for energy insecurities. The 
majority of empirical work has been in relation to 
oil, and our work reflects this, focusing primarily on 
macroeconomic costs of oil market uncertainties, 
although also briefly discussing evidence relating to 
coal and gas. 
The mechanisms through which pecuniary 
externalities arise are described in later paragraphs. 
However, the classification of all macroeconomic 
costs as externalities is not universally accepted and 
the identification of an externality effect is 
important in determining appropriate policy 
responses.  
To date, the macroeconomic consequences of 
energy market changes have largely been the result 
of activities in the world oil market, but if there 
were to be a similar dependence on other imported 
fuels in the energy mix, in principle the mechanisms 
would also apply to these other fuel sources. Thus, 
whilst the following section identifies empirically 
observed mechanisms by which oil price increases 
bring about macroeconomic changes, these may be 
seen to be based on generic macroeconomic 
principles. 
Following the majority of economic modelling of 
energy prices and their macroeconomic linkages, a 
clear line of causation exists from oil price increase 
to macroeconomic impact: 
1.  Payment for oil imports results in a worsening 
trade balance for an importing country (since 
higher fuel prices result in an increase in total 
payments – assuming fuel price inelasticity). 
2.  The consequent current account and balance-of-
payments deficits, and associated depreciation 
of the exchange rate, result in other more costly 
imports from outside the EU. 
3.  Higher import costs – of oil and other 
commodities – may lead to higher price levels 
and inflation. Higher unemployment may result 
from the transfer of resources needed to pay for 
the oil imports and lower GDP may result.   
This is a simplification of the central mechanism. 
There is considerable discussion about a number of 
complicating factors in the operation of such a 
mechanism (Bohi & Toman, 1996). For example, 
the terms of trade effects may be positive or 
negative. Additionally, whilst it is acknowledged 
that higher oil prices raise prices, unless these prices 
continue to rise there will not be on-going inflation. 
Thus, whilst energy price increases may aggravate 
existing inflationary processes, they should not be 
seen as the cause of continuing inflation. 
There also appears to be the threat of government – 
rather than market – failure that contributes to the 
macroeconomic impacts of energy price increases 
(Bohi & Toman, 1996). Because of regulation, e.g., 
an increase in oil prices will not lead to efficient 
adjustments in gas and electricity prices. These price 
rigidities may cause adjustment problems 
throughout the economy where regulation cannot 
simultaneously constrain market power and allow 
regulated prices to adjust to market conditions. 
The externality estimates are based on total macro-
economic costs associated with given changes in 
energy markets. They are derived directly from a 
review of the historically observed macroeconomic 
effects of these changes, as well as changes that are 
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In the following analysis we look principally at the 
impact of sudden, but sustained, increases in price 
on the macro-economy.  
2. Modelling  the  Macroeconomic 
Impacts of Oil Price Increases 
A number of general equilibrium macroeconomic 
models have been developed to simulate the impact 
of energy price increases and/or supply disruptions 
on the macro-economy and these have largely 
focused on the impacts of oil supply shocks that last 
for a year or more. Note that whilst price volatility 
in itself has potential macroeconomic consequences, 
they are not regarded as being as significant as the 
sustained price rises resulting from medium-term oil 
price shocks and are not studied separately here.  
The outputs of such models are helpful in isolating 
these impacts from other macroeconomic trends – 
something that a reliance on untreated observational 
data is unable to do. This section therefore briefly 
reviews the output of a number of these models in 
terms of their EU-wide macroeconomic costs of 
energy price rises. Hunt & Markandya (2004) 
reviewed the published results produced by these 
models up to 2004, shown in Table 1. The results 
reviewed after 2004 that are most pertinent are 
reported in Table 2. In general, the differences 
between the two sets of results are small; we 
therefore conclude that the same input values used 
to produce the Hunt & Markandya (2004) external 
cost estimates are valid to apply in our updated 
calculations. 
Roeger (2005) used the DSGE model to estimate the 
effects of a 50% oil price rise on the euro area’s 
macro-economy. The paper does not give the 
baseline price. After 4 quarters, GDP is 0.5% lower 
than the baseline case, and falls further to 0.6% after 
2 years and 0.9% after 5 years. Other studies that 
have presented results of this kind include World 
Bank (2005).  
The summary results do not reflect the complexity 
of the models and the variety of their outputs for 
world regions. Nevertheless, despite the models’ 
differences, there is some consistency in the pattern 
and extent of GDP changes. The models show that 
even when the oil price increase is assumed to be 
permanent, GDP impacts are likely to be greatest in 
the first four years of the price increase, and decline 
subsequently, suggesting that economic agents adapt 
their expectations to the new price level so that 
factor and product markets move to new equilibria 
over this time period. Surprisingly, there is also a 
degree of consistency in the scale of annual GDP 
losses associated with specific oil price increases. 
Thus for the industrialised countries a $10 price 
increase per barrel gives rise to a 0.5% loss of GDP 
(European Commission, 2002) or a proportionate 
linear scaling of that, on average (IMF, 2000). For 
the eurozone countries, there is a similar consistency 
in the results although here it appears that GDP is 
more sensitive to oil price increases than for the 
industrialised countries as a whole. For eurozone 
countries, as presented in Table 2, a 50% increase in 
oil prices results in a 0.4% decline in annual GDP 
for the first year, simply taking the arithmetic mean 
of these results, with a range of 0.1% to 0.8%. 
A number of strong assumptions are adopted in 
order to derive these values and these are explained 
in detail below. In addition, the macroeconomic cost 
estimates only allow us to include the effect of a 
sustained price increase. No separate estimates 
based on price volatility are made since there are – 
as yet – no good studies of sectoral or 
macroeconomic costs resulting from price volatility 
(Sauter & Awerbuch, 2003). We therefore assume 
that the unit value estimates derived here are 
minimal. We assume for simplicity that the time 
period considered is only one year. The greater 
uncertainty for impacts in subsequent periods 
suggests that at the very least this gives rise to a 
plausible minimum estimate. 
In order to estimate the external effects of energy 
insecurity in terms of cost per kilowatt hour, we 
follow the same methodology as Hunt & Markandya 
(2004). As with the earlier work, we assume that the 
main externality is the set of macroeconomic effects 
and that these can be classified as externalities. 
We make the conversion from gross macroeconomic 
costs to costs per kilowatt hour via a series of steps. 
The first step is to identify a benchmark for the 
world oil price against which deviations in price – 
and therefore GDP – can be measured as a reference 
value in the event of an oil price change, for 
instance. However, the predictive models reviewed 
do not make this assumption explicit. We are 
therefore obliged to simply adopt the outputs from 
these models in our analysis. Similarly, whilst we 
would like to make explicit a second step to 
apportion a price increase that can be seen as typical 
for a given oil supply reduction – and thus to allow 
us to relate a GDP change resulting from a price 
change to the energy production from a given 
volume of oil – we have to assume that a 50% price 
increase (most frequently used in the models) is 
appropriate. Total GDP for the EU27 in 2005 
equalled €10.9 trillion. Therefore, a 0.4% fall in 
GDP – identified from Table 3 – equates to €43.8 
billion p.a. or €175.2 billion over a four-year period. 
For the world as a whole, the equivalent figures are 
€142.7 billion p.a. and €570 billion over the four-
year period. 4 | Steve Arnold & Alistair Hunt 
 
Table 1. Macroeconomic cost estimates of oil price increases  
Source Driver  Estimate  Units  Country/Region 
EC (2002)  Sustained $10 increase in 
price of crude oil (per 
barrel) 
- 0.5%  GDP growth rate  Industrialised 
countries 
IEA (2004)  Sustained increase $25-
$35 i.e. $10 per barrel 
crude oil 
- 0.5%  GDP growth rate  Eurozone 
   0.5%  Inflation    Eurozone 
IMF (2000)  Sustained increase of $5 
per barrel of crude oil 
(20% increase) 
- 0.25% (over first four years, 
then fades to negligible) 
GDP growth rate  World 
- 0.4% (percentage deviation 
from baseline after one year) 
GDP growth rate  Euro area 
0.5% (percentage deviation from 
baseline after one year) 
Inflation Euro  Area 
  
- 7.8 ($ billion)  Trade balance   Euro area 
IMF (2004)  Sustained increase of $5 
per barrel of crude oil 
(20% increase) 
- 0.4% (after one year)  GDP growth rate  Euro zone 
Jones et al. 
(2002) 
Price change exceeding a 
three year high 
- 0.05 to - 0.06  Elasticity GDP to 
oil price shocks 
US 
- 1.5% (for 3-6 months)  GDP growth rate  Eurozone  Sauter & 
Awerbuch 
(2003) 
Sustained 10% rise in oil 
price  - EURO 35 to 70 billion   GDP   Eurozone 
- 0.25% (over first two years)  GDP growth rate  Industrial countries  World Bank 
(2000) in 
IMF (2000) 
50% increase in price in 
first year, then decline 
back to original level by 
the third year. 
0.2% Inflation  Industrial  countries 
Huntington 
(2004) 
Doubling of oil price  -3.7%  GDP  US and eurozone 
Price level: 1% increase  0.44%  % change in 
investment 
IEA member 
countries 
IEA (2001) 
Price volatility: 1% 
increase 
- 0.11%  % change in 
investment 
IEA member 
countries 
Source: Hunt & Markandya (2004). 
Table 2. Impact on eurozone GDP from a 50% increase in oil prices (deviation from baseline GDP after 1 yr) 
Source Year  Driver  Estimate  (%)  Country/Region 
Barell & Pomerantz  2004  50% increase in oil prices  -0.8  Eurozone 
EU Commission  2004  50% increase in oil prices  -0.5  Eurozone 
Dalsgaard et al.  2001  50% increase in oil prices  -0.4  Eurozone 
World Bank   2000  50% increase in oil prices  -0.3  World 
Hunt et al.  2001  50% increase of oil prices  -0.1  Eurozone 
Dieppe & Henry  2004  50% increase of oil prices  -0.1  Eurozone 
 
In order to express the estimated welfare cost of the 
oil price change in the same terms as the rest of the 
externalities considered by CASES, it must be 
decided whether the loss is expressed per barrel of 
oil consumed or per barrel of oil foregone. We 
consider that it is correct to assign the cost across 
the barrels consumed as this can be taken to be the 
cost per kilowatt hour of electricity generated. This 
will give the average cost. 
Given that we have now derived a macroeconomic 
cost per barrel of oil not supplied to the market, i.e. 
its opportunity cost, we need to make the final 
conversion to the energy provided by one barrel of 
oil. The conversion factor for changing barrels per 
day into kilowatt hours is shown in Table 3. A 
conversion factor of 40% to estimate total electricity 
production per possible kWh output was used to 
reflect the energy-generating capabilities of oil-fired 
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Table 3. Summary of cost estimation process: 
Oil security externality 
   EU27 
GDP loss over 1 year (€bn)  43.8  
GDP loss over 4 years (€bn)  175.1  
     
Original oil consumption (mb/day)  82.5 
Fall in oil consumption (mb/day)  3 
New oil consumption (mb/day)  79.5 
     
Change in GDP per barrel consumed 
(1-year loss) (€)  1.5  
Change in GDP per barrel consumed 
(4-year loss) (€)  6.0  
     
Electricity generation per barrel (kWh)  1648.8  
Thermal efficiency  40% 
Likelihood of shock  0.2 
Cost estimate per kWh – 1-year loss (€)  0.002289 
Cost estimate per kWh – 4-year loss (€)  0.009154 
     
Cost (€/kWh) 1-year loss   0.000458 
Cost (€/kWh) 4-year loss  0.001831 
Cost proportional to electricity generation 
(€/kWh) 0.000004 
 
Since the project is focused on the external costs of 
electricity generation, the costs from the model so 
far need to be apportioned to the level of oil being 
used in electricity. Thus, we estimate the proportion 
of oil that is used for electricity generation and the 
proportion of electricity generation that arises from 
oil-fired power plants. At this stage, aggregated 
figures for the whole EU will suffice, but 
disaggregated data could highlight interesting facets 
of the scenario.  
In 2004, 4% of EU25 electricity production came 
from oil
1 and the proportion of oil used in the EU 
for electricity generation was 5%.
2 Thus, the 
proportion of oil price variation that can be 
apportioned to electricity generation is 0.04*0.05 = 
0.00002. 
Since we want an annual equivalent, these figures 
need to be multiplied by the probability of the event 
occurring in any given year to give us expected 
values. As an indication the current probability of a 
price increase of this magnitude occurring can be 
approximated on the basis of historical data. Harks 
(2003) estimates that a 3 million barrel shortfall 
event may be expected to occur at present on a 1 in 
5 year frequency, based on historical events. 
                                                      
 
 
Adopting this probability, the resulting expected 
value for the EU27 – assuming a 0.4% annual loss 
in GDP – is €0.000004 per kWh within a range of 
€0.000001 - €0.000008 for a 0.1% and 0.8% annual 
GDP loss. The breakdown of this model is shown in 
Table 3. 
The model presented above is a simplified model of 
the economy that asks ‘what is the cost of this event 
happening, and what is the likelihood of the event?’ 
It estimates an upper bound to the external 
pecuniary effects of a fall in supply of oil to the 
EU’s electricity generating sector. 
3.  Gas and Coal 
The above section has looked at the energy security 
externalities related to the macroeconomic effects of 
oil price rises. It found that the small levels of 
electricity generation from the use of oil in the EU 
imply that these externalities are very small. Gas, 
coal and nuclear power have much larger shares of 
the electricity generation so that price volatility of 
these may have significant effects.  
Russia, Algeria and Norway were the three largest 
suppliers of natural gas imports to the EU27 from 
1999-2006, with Nigeria significantly smaller, 
whilst Russia, Australia and South Africa were the 
largest source of coal imports to the EU. However, 
whilst energy security risks from these fuels are well 
known, see Stern (2004) for example on possible 
causes of gas insecurity, to our knowledge, no 
quantitative analysis has been undertaken on the 
macroeconomic – or other – sources of possible 
external costs from such risks. We highlight this as a 
research gap.  
4. Overall  Conclusions 
The measurement of energy security externalities 
remains a complex and difficult exercise. Problems 
of definition as to what constitutes these 
externalities make agreement on the policy 
implications hazardous. Additionally, the range of 
assumptions that need to be made in order to 
calculate quantitative estimates of the size of these 
externalities means that these estimates should be 
viewed as indicative only. There are also a range of 
gaps in the coverage of the analysis, notably the 
exclusion of oil price volatility impacts, and the 
potential macroeconomic costs of gas and coal 
supply disruption, which suggests that the negligible 
values (around 0.000004 €/kWh) currently 
estimated are much lower than the true costs, 
whether categorised as external or not.  
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